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RAPHAEL KONIGSBERG, Petitioner, v. THE STATE 
BAR OF CALIFORNIA et at, Respondents. 
[1] Attorneys-Admi88ion to Bar-Eligibility-Loyalty to Govern-
ment.-An applicant's persistent refusal to answer questions 
put to him by the Committee of Bar Examiners concerning 
either past or present membership in or affiliation with the 
Communist Party after being warned that such conduct would 
require denial of his certification to admission to practice 
justified the cOlllmittee in refusing to certify him where, in 
view of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6064.1, enjoining the commit-
tee against certifying for admission to practice any person 
who "advocates the overthrow of the Government of the 
United States or of this State by force, violence, or other 
unconstitutional means," which clearly requires the committee 
to inquire as to such advocacy, and the fact that Congress 
(68 Stat. 775; 50 U.S.C. § 841) and the state Legislature 
(Gov. Code, § 1027.5) have declared that the Comlllunist 
Party advocates such overthrow, the inquiry as to member-
ship in that party was relevant and mat~rial in determining 
whether the proscribed advocacy existed. 
PROCEEDING to review action of the Committee of Bar 
Examiners in refusing to certify petitioner for admission to 
practice law and application to the Supreme Court for ad-
mission to practice. Petition for review and application 
to Supreme Court denied. 
Edward Mosk for Petitioner. 
A. L. Wirin, Fred Okrand and High R. Manes as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. . 
Frank B. Belcher, Robert D. Burch and Ralph E. Lewis 
for Respondents. 
THE COURT .-Petitioner seeks review of the action of the 
Committee of Bar Examiners in refusing to certify him to 
this court for admission to practice law in California. Also, 
he has applied directly to this court for admission to practice. 
The Committee of Bar Examiners is established by the 
[1] See CaLJur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 38. 
Mclt. Dig. Reference: [1] Attorneys, § 15.1. 
52 C.2d·-2:i 
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B(lllrl'l of Gov!'rnors or The Stat<.> Bar of California pursuant 
to statutory aut.hority. It. ('ononds t.11P bar rxamiuations and 
certifies directly to this court those applicants for admission 
who fulfill the requirements of the code (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 6046). This court may admit to practice any applicant so 
certified (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6064). An applieant who 
~ refu,sed certification lllay have the action of the committee 
reviewed by this court (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6066). 
The code specifically provides (§ 6064.1) that" [n] 0 person I 
who advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United 
States or of this State by force, violence, or other unconstitu-
tional means, shall be certified . . . for admission. . . ." 
In October, 1953, petitioner took and passed the written bar 
examination. Shortly before that examination, and on several 
later occasions, hearings were conducted by a subcommittee 
and the full Committee of Bar Examiners. 
An ex-Communist testified that petitioner had attended ' 
meetings of a Communist Party unit in 1941. Petitioner of-
fered much evidence of his satisfactory service in the Army 
during World War II, and of his good character and loyalty. 
The evidence of these hearings is reviewed in some detail in 
the several opinions ill Konigsb('.rg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 
[77 S.Ct. 722, 1 L.Ed.2d 810]. Petitioner denied that he 
advocated overthro,v of the government, but refused to answer 
any questions of committce members as to his membership in 
the Communist Party, asserting that such inquiries infringed 
rights guaranteed him by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States. 
The committee, by letter of May 17, 1954, advised petitioner 
that his application was denied on grounds that he had not 
sustained his burden of establishing that he (1) possessed 
the good moral character required by section 6060, subdivision 
(c), of the code, or (2) did not advocate unlawful overthrow 
of the government, the showing required by section 6064.1. 
Petitioner thereupon sought review by this court. His peti-
tion was denied April 20, 1955, without opinion, by a divided 
court. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
On May 6, 1957, that court, with thr<.>e justices dissenting alld 
one not participating, reversed and remanded'the matter to 
this court" for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion" (Ko1l·igsberg v. State Bar, supra, 353 U.S. 252). 
In doing so, the United States Supreme Court held (p. 273) 
that "there is no evidence in the record which rationally jus-
tifies a finding that Konigsberg iniled to establish his good 
() 
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mOl'<lI cha.-ader or failed to show that he did \lot a,lvo"lIhl 
forceful ovel·throw of the Government." 
That court specifically pointed out (p. 259) that Koni:,.rsherl.! 
"was not denied admission to the California Bar simply h('-
cause he refused to answer questions," and noted that he had 
not been told that he would be barred" just because he refused 
to answer relevant inquiries or because he was obstructing the 
Committee." In this connection it was said (p. 261) that 
"Serious questions of elemental fairness would be raised if 
the Committee had excluded Konigsberg simply because he 
failed to answer questions without first explicitly warning 
him that he could be barred for this reason alone. . . ." 
The court stated (353 U.S. at pp. 261-262) that "If it were 
possible for us to say that the ... [committee] had barred 
Konigsberg solely because of his refusal to respond to its in-
quiries into his political associations and his opinions about 
matters of public interest, then we would be compelled to 
decide far-reaching and complex questions relating to freedom 
of speech, press and assembly. There is no justification for our 
straining to reach these difficult problems when the . . • [com-
mittee] itself has not seen fit, at any time, to base its exclusion 
of Konigsberg on his failure to answer. If and when a State 
makes failure to answer a question an independent ground for 
exclusion from the Bar, then this Court, as the cases arise, 
will have to determine whether the exclusion is constitutionally 
permissible. We do not mean to intimate any view on that 
problem here nor do 've mean to approve or disapprove Konigs. 
berg's refusal to answer the particular questions asked him." 
Following the remand, this court vacated its prior order 
denying the petition for review and referred the entire matter, 
including the application for admission to the bar filed with ml 
by petitioner after the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court, to the Committee of Bar Examiners for further pro-
ceedings. The committee conducted a hearing September 2], 
1957. 
At this hearing, the records of all previous hearings were 
incorporated by stipulation as part of the record, petitioner 
and a witness called by him were examined, and petitioner I 
introduced letters recommending him as to character and 
loyalty. No evidence additional to that received in the 1953-1954 
llearings was offered as reflecting on petitioner's loyalty or to 
show his advocacy of overthrow of the government. Thus a 
finding that he was not of good moral character or that he 
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with the decision of the United States Supreme Court upon 
the previous record. 
At the 1957 hearing, however, the committee did fully advise 
petitioner and his counsel that his refusal to answer material 
questions put to him by it would obstruct its investigation of 
his qualifications to practice law, with the result. that the 
committee would not be able to certify him for admission. It 
was made clear to him that questions concerning membership 
in the Communist Party were deemed material. Nonetheless, 
petitioner refused to answer any and all questions put to him 
by the committee concerning either past or present member-
ship in or affiliation with the Communist Party. The commit-
tee then found that Konigsberg had refused to answer its 
questions as to his membership in or affiliation with the Com-
munist Party, that these questions were material to a proper 
determination of his qualifications, that his refusal to answer 
had obstructed the investigation which the statute requires, 
and that because of this refusal the committee is unable to 
certify him for admission. 
It is this action which petitioner seeks to have reviewed. It 
differs materially from that of 1954. The committee action 
now before us contains no findings or conclusion that peti-
tioner had failed to establish either his good moral character 
or his abstention from advocacy of overthrow of the govern-
ment. 
[1] Here it is the refusal to answer material questions 
which is the basis for denial of certification. Petitioner's 
refusal to answer is conceded. The issue is whether the ques-
tions are material. We think their materiality is clear. The 
committee is enjoined against certifying for admission to 
practice any person who "advocates the overthrow of the 
Government of the United States or of this State by force, vio-
lence, or other unconstitutional means." (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 6064.1.) This provision clearly requires the committee to 
inquire as to such advocacy .. The Congress (68 Stat. 775; 50 
U.S.C. § 841) and the California Legislature (Gov. Code, 
§ 1027.5) have declared that the Communist Party does advo-
cate such overthrow. It follows that inquiry as to membership 
in that party is relevant and" material in determining whether 
the proscribed advocacy exists. Petitioner refused to answer 
questions as to such membership at periods after the statutory 
proscription and after the legislative declarations of the pur. 
pose of the Communist Party. As we have 11oted, he persisted 
in his refusal after being warned that such conduct would be 
deemed to require denial of his certification by the committee. 
CJ 
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Wf! are l.llIahll' tn distinguish this :-ilnat ion frolll that. prc-
sentcd in Reiffl" v. B(I(u-d ()f Public Rd1INI.tioll, 357 U.S. 399 
[78 S.Ct. 1317, 1324, 2 L.Ed_2d 1414, 1433]. 'l'hl'('(~ a school 
teacher refused to answer questions as to his loyalty. This 
refusal was made the basis for a finding of "incompetency." 
There, as here, there was no finding that the individual was 
in fact disloyal, but merely a finding that his refusal to 
answer questions pertinent to his IO~'alty revealed a lack of 
candor which constituted unfitness. Our case is somewhat 
stronger in that here a statute specifically requires the com-
mittee to certify that petitioner does not advocate overthrow 
of the government, and the question as to party membership 
bears upon that issue. In Beilan, as here, there was no r1l II' 
specifically providing that the failure to answer would be 
deemed ground for adverse action, but here, as there, the 
investigating authority gave clear warning that such a result 
would follow. 
In its previous decision in this case, the United States Su-
preme Court held only that the evidence was insufficient to 
sustain a finding that petitioner is not of good moral character. 
'l'he present record contains no additional evidence on that 
subject. However, the refusal to certify for admission ic;, on 
the present record, based wholly upon his refusal to answer 
pertinent questions. This ground wac; specifically left open 
in the earlier decision of that court aud subsequent decisions 
have recognized this fact. (Beilan v. Board of Public Educa-
tion, supra, p. 409; Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 478 [78 
S.Ct. 1311, 1324, 2 L.Ed.2d 1423, 1433].) 
Determination whether petitioner was a member of the 
party which has been legislatively determined to advocate 
overthrow of the government was blocked by his refusal to 
answer. Such refusal likewise effectively prevented the com-
mittee from reaching the question whether, if he were such 
a member, his membership wac; knowing or innocent. The 
committee's refusal to recommend him for admission W8!ol 
based upon his refu!olnl to answer inquiries about his relevant 
activities-not upon those activitie!ol thE'mselves. Thus its re-
fusal is fully justified under the rule of Beilan, which dispose!ol 
of his claim that his constitutional rights have been infringed. 
Petitioner docs not question tll(, constitutionality of the 
code section whieh prohibits certification of one who advo-
cates unlawful overthrow of the government, nor of the fed-
eral and !;tate legishitive declarations that the Communist 
Party seel;:s snell o\·erthrow. Implicit in tll<" statutory provi-
77* [52 C.2ll 
sion for review of the committee's refusal to certify an appli· 
{'ant is the power of this court to admit one not so certified. 
But to admit applicants who refuse to answer the committee's 
questions upon these subjects would nullify the concededly 
yalid .legislative direction to the committee. Such a rule would 
effectively stifle committee inquiry upon issues legislatively 
declared to be relevant to that issue. We cannot in good 
conscience deny the committee the right to inquire into a 
matter as to which it must certify. Whether the members of 
this court consider such a statute effective, practical or wise 
is irrelevant. We do not act in a legislative capacity. Rather, 
we recognize and enforce legislation which is valid. 
We adopt and approve the finding;; of the committee stated 
in the 1957 report. The petition for review and the applica-
tion for admission to the bar are denied. 
Gibson, C. J., deeming himself disqualified, did not partici- i 
pate. 
Draper, J., sat pro tempore· in place of the Chief Justice. 
White, J., not having been a member of the court at the 
time of oral argument, did not participate: 
TRAYNOR, Acting C. J.-I dissent. 
The United States Supreme Court has determined that 
Konigsberg was denied due process of law and equal pro-
tection of the laws on the ground that "the evidence does 
not rationally support the only two grounds upon which the 
Committee relied in rejecting his application for admis-
sion to the California Bar." (Konigsberg v. State Bar, 
353 U.S. 252, 262 [77 S.Ct. 722, 1 L.Ed.2d 810].) In its 
words, "there is no evidence in the record whieh rationally 
justifies a finding that Konigsberg failed to establish his good 
moral character or failed to show that he did not advocate 
forceful overthrow of the Government. Without some au-
thentic reliable evidence of unlawful or immO'l'al actions reo 
fleeting adversely upon him, it is difficult to comprehend why 
the State Bar Committee rejected a man of Konigsberg's 
background and Cllal'acter as morally unfit to practice law." 
(353 U.S. at 273.) 
It declined to determine whether Konigsberg could be ex-
* As~ign",l by Acting Chairman of Judicial Council. 
C) 
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I'luded from practice solely because of his refusal to answer 
quest.ions, stating: 
"There is nothing in t.he California statutes, t.he California 
ciel'isions, or even in the Rules of t.he Bar Committee, which 
has heen raUed to our attention, that suggests that failure 
to answer a Bar Examiner's inquiry is, ipso facto, a basis 
for excluding an applicant from the Bar, irrespective of how 
ovenvhelming is his showing of good character or loyalty 
or how flimsy are the suspicions of the Bar Examiners. Seri-
ous questions of elemental fairness would be raised if the 
Committee had excluded Konigsberg simply because he failed 
to answer questions without first explicitly warning him that 
he could be barred for this reason alone, even though his 
moral character and loyalty were unimpeachable, and then 
giving him a chance to comply. In our opinion, there is 
nothing in the record which indicates that the Committee, in 
a matter of such grave importance to Konigsberg, applied 
a brand new exclusionary rule to his application-all without 
telling him that it was doing so. 
"If it were possible for us to say that the Board had barred 
Konigsberg solely because of his refusal to respond to its 
inquiries into his political associations and his opinions about 
matters of public interest, then we would be compelled to 
decide far-reaching and complex questions relating to free-
dom of speech, press and assembly. There is no justification 
for our straining to reach these difficult problems when the 
Board itself has not seen fit, at any time, to base its exclusion 
of Konigsberg on his failure to answer. If and when a State 
makes failure to answer a question an independent ground i 
for exclusion from the Bar, then this Court, as the cases 
arise, will have to determine whether the exclusion is con-
stitutionally permissible. We do not mean to intimate 
any view on that problem here nor do we mean to approve 
or disapprove Konigsberg's refusal to answer the particular 
questions asked him." (353 U.S. at 260, 262, footnotes 
omitted.) 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment 
of this court and remanded the case "for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion." (353 U.S. at 274.) In 
view of the questions expressly left undecided and the court's 
remand, it is my opinion that this court is not foreclosed 
by the United States Suprl'lUe Court's decision in this case 
from adopting and applying to Konigsberg a rule making 
776 KONIGSBERG l.'. STAn; BAR 
failure to answer rl'levant questions with respect to his quali-
fications an independent ground for exclusion. 
An applicant ordinarily has the burden of establishing his 
. qualifications to practice law, and if he refuses to answt'r 
questions relevant to his qualifications, it is my opinion that 
this court is justified in denying him admission. Given the 
congressional and state legislative findings with regard to 
the Communist Party and the adjudications of guilt of its 
leaders of criminal advocacy, a question as to present or past 
membership in that party is relevant to the issue of possible 
criminal advocacy and hence to the applicant's qualifications. 
Whatever its relevancy in a particular context, however, 
it is an extraordinary variant of the usual inquiry into 
crime, for the attendant burden of proof upon anyone under 
question poses the immediate threat of prior restraint upon 
the free speech of all applicants. The possibility of inquiry 
into their speech, the heavy burden upon them to establish 
its innocence, and the evil repercussions of inquiry despite 
innocence, would constrain them to speak their minds so non-
committally that no one could ever mistake their innocuous 
words for advocacy. This grave danger to freedom of speech 
could be averted without loss to legitimate investigation by 
shifting the burden to the examiners. Confronted with a 
prima facie case, an applicant would then be obliged to 
rebut it. 
Such a procedure is logically dictated by Spe·iser v. Randall, 
357 U.S. 513 [78 S.Ct. 1332, 1352, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460]. The 
court there assumed that the state could deny a tax exemption 
to one whose advocacy of the unlawfnl overthrow of the 
government was such that it could be punished as a crime. 
Mindful of the risks to free speech, however, it took care to 
hold that the state could not compel the taxpayer to prove 
his right to an exemption and that therefore an oath as to 
his innocence of unlawful advocacy could not be required. 
There may be differences of degree in the p~blic interest.in 
the fitness of the applicants for tax exemption and for ad-
mission to the Bar. Even though the state may have more 
at stake in the latter situation, it is not therefore freer to 
cndanger free speech needlessly. 
Inquiry on the issue of advocacy of the unlawful over-
throw of the government is a greedy camel; it does not easily 
take its leave. It has a way of moving on into the domain 
of lawful economic and political belief, !!peech, and activity. 
It bears noting that such advocacy, whether it carries crimi· 
) 
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11al or civil sanctions, is lInlikE' ,· .. illll·X whosl' "lement.s readily 
set them apart from ]{·gitimatl' 1I!'livit.y. (C/., Dennis v. 
United States, 341 U.S. 494 [71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137], 
with Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 [77 S.Ct. 1064, 
1 hEd.2d 1356].) It a1<;0 bears noting that such advocacy 
is not invariably associated with even active membership in 
the Communist Party. (Yates v. United States, supra.) 
Such considerations as these may have led to the result 
in Speiser v. Randall, supra, 357 U.S. 513. In contrast an 
applicant for public employment can be required to state 
whether or not he is or was a member of the Communist Party, 
as a condition of his employment. (Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 
468 [78 S.Ct. 1311, 2 L.Ed.2d 1423] ; Bel1an v. Board 0/ Public 
Education, 357 U.S. 399 [78 S.Ct. 1317, 1324, 2 L.Ed.2d 
1414, 1433] ; Steinmetz v. California State Board 0/ Educa-
tion,44 Ca1.2d 816, 823 [285 P.2d 617] ; Pockman v. Leonard, 
39 Cal.2d 676, 685-687 [249 P.2d 267].) Since an attorney 
is neither a public employee nor a taxpayer seeking an exemp-
tion, we do not know how the United States Supreme Court 
would resolve the constitutional issue here. Still, it has em-
phasized t.he importance of an independent Bar, Rnd it has 
declared that petitioner's insistence on a constitutional right 
not to answer the questions here illvolYl'tl was not frivolous. 
(Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 270, 273 [77 S.Ct. 
722, 1 L.Ed.2d 810].) 
We need not resolve the constitutional question, for the 
Legislature has not directed that section 6064.1 of the Busi-
ness and Professions Code- be enforced by compelling ap-
plicants to answer all questions relevant to the proscribed 
advocacy, and significantly, it has not required declarations 
of nonadvocacy from members of the Bar. It rests solely 
with this court, in its supervision of admissions to the Bar, 
to determine whether petitioner must answer the questions 
in issue. The question is not whether the Legislature might 
constitutionally impose such requirements ,but whether this 
court should impose them. There is no good reason for the 
court to do so, particularly when the Legislature has made 
110 attempt to impose them on practicing attorneys. 
The United States Supreme Court has determined that 
Konigsberg established his good moral character and that 
·"No person who advoea.tes the overthrow of the Government of the 
United States or of this State by foree, violenee, or other uneonstitu-
tional means, sllall be eertified to the Supreme Court for admission and 
:1 Ii .. ense to practice law." 
C) 
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he did not advocate unlawful overthrow of the government. 
In the subsequent hearing there was no additional evidence 
adverse to Konigsberg. The committee did no more than 
make clear to him that his failure to answer would be an 
independent ground for not certifying him to this court. 
Konigsberg chose to stand on his constitutional objections, 
and as the United States Supreme Court pointed out, there 
is "nothing in the record which indicates that his position 
was not taken in good faith." (353 U.S. at 270.) If the 
committee had evidence that would support a finding of 
unlawful advocacy, it could compel Konigsberg to disclose 
political statements and associations in rebuttal or forego 
admission to the Bar. As the United States Supreme Court 
held, the committee made no prima facie case against Konigs-
berg, and we are bound by that holding. I would therefore 
grant the petition of Konigsberg and admit him to the Bar 
of this state. 
PETERS, J.-I dissent. 
The majority opinion disregards the law of this case as 
already established by the United States Supreme Court. 
(Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 [77 8.Ct. 722, 1 L.Ed. 
2d 810].) It misconstrnes the high court's opinion, and in 
particular misconstrues the legal effect of the order of that 
court remanding the case" for further proceedings not incon-
sistent with this opinion." (Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 
U.S. at p. 274.) The result is that, in my opinion, applicant 
has been denied due process and equal protection. 
The only issues before The State Bar in its first proceeding 
were whether the applicant was of good moral character and 
whether he advocated the forceful overthrow of the govern-
ment of the United States. The burden was upon applicant 
to establish those facts. Lengthy hearings were held. At 
these hearings applicant furnished overwhelming evidence of 
his good moral character and of the fact that he did not 
advocate and had never advocated the forceful overthrow 
of the government. He refused to answer any question as to 
his political affiliations. The State Bar refused to certify 
the applicant for admission 011 the ground that he llad failed 
to sustain his burden on the two issues involved. The appli-
cant sought review by this conrt. The petition was denied 
without opinion. The United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari. That court then reversed this court and The 
State Bar and held that the applicant llad sustained his 
o 
Od. 1 !)ij!} J KONIGSB~:R(J I'. STATE BAR 
[52 C.2d 769: 344 P.2d 777) 
7;9 
hurden of proof on the two key iSllues, and that on the 
showing made the applicant should have been ccrtified for 
admission. The case was remanded "for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion." (Konigsberg v. Sta.te 
Bar, 353 U.S. at p. 274.) 
Following this remand this court, by a divided vote, instead 
of certifying the applicant, vacated its prior order and re-
ferred the case back to The State Bar for further proceed-
ings. No showing was then or later made that any new evi-
dence or facts had been discovered. The State Bar then held 
a so-called hearing. It was stipulated that the entire prior 
record should be introduced. The State Bar had admittedly 
hired an investigator to check on the" applicant while the 
case had been pending in the courts, but it did not produce 
him or offer any evidence at all. The. petitioner produced 
additional evidence in further support of his contentions 
that he was of good moral character and a loyal citizen. No 
question was asked him that had not been asked on the prior 
hearing, and no answer was given that had not already been 
given. The only difference between the two hearings was 
that at the.last one petitioner was warned that his failure to 
answer questions as to his political affiliations could be con-
strued as lack of cooperation that would justify a denial of 
his application. 
Thus petitioner, in the first hearing, presented overwhelming 
evidence that he was of good moral character and a loyal 
citizen. The highest court in the land so held. Then, on pre-
cisely that same record, the record that the high court had 
held demonstrated that the applicant had sustained his burden 
as a matter of law, the majority of this court have held that 
The State Bar properly denied certification because this time 
applicant was warned that the failure to answer certain ques-
tions would be construed as lack of cooperation. How many 
times does the issue of whether applicant possesses a good 
moral character and is a loyal citizen have to be tried' Those 
were the issues presented. Having sustained his -burden as to 
those issues, on what rational theory ean it be held that The 
State Bar, at this late date, with no new evidence, can offer 
a new and different excuse for denying certification' When 
does this litigation (~()me to an end' I hac' always thought, 
until I read the majo,·ity opilliol1 ill this cast', that our !!ystt'11I 
of law was predieated on the fnlldallwlltal theory that, whell 
issues betwrrn litigants have once be!'n determined, they call-
o 
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not be relitigated. I had always thought that litigants were 
required to raise all relevant issues in one proceeding. I had 
assumed that parties cannot litigate their case piecemeal. 
The majority purport to find sanction for this violation ! 
of fundamental principles in the order of the United States 
Supreme Court, heretofore quoted, remanding the ease "for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion" 
(Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. at p. 274), and in several 
sentences contained in the opinion. The majority do not 
quote all the relevant language. At page 259 of the high 
court opinion appears the following: 
"In Konigsberg's petition for review to the State Supreme 
Court there is no suggestion that the Committee had excluded 
him merely for failing to respond to its inquiries. Nor did the 
Committee in its answer indicate that this was the basis for 
its action. After responding to Konigsberg's allegations, 
the Bar Committee set forth a defense of its action which in 
substance repeated the reasons it had given Konigsberg in the 
formal notice of denial for rejecting his application. 
"There is nothing in the California statutes, the California 
decisions, or even in the Rules of the Bar Committee, which 
has been called to our attention, [and there is still nothing 
in such statutes, decisions or rules] that suggests that failure 
to answer a Bar Examiner's inquiry is ipso facto, a basis for 
excluding an applicant from the Bar, irrespective of how 
overwhelming is his showing of good character or loyalty or 
how flimsy are the suspicions of the Bar Examiners. Serious 
questions of elemental fairness would be raised if the Com-
mittee had excluded Konigsberg simply because he failed to 
answer questions without first explicitly warning him that 
he could be barred for this reason alone, even though his moral 
character and loyalty were unimpeachable, and then giving 
him a chance to comply. In our opinion, there is nothing in 
the record which indicates that the Committee, in a matter 
of such grave importance to Konigsberg, applied a brand new 
exclusionary rule to his application-all without telling him 
that it was doing so. • 
"If it were possible for us to say that the Board had 
barred Konigsberg solely because of his refusal to respond to 
its inquiries into his political associations and his opinions 
about matters of publ ic interest, then we would be compelled 
to decide far-reaching and complex questions relating to free-
dom of speech, press and assembly. There is no justification 
C) 
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for our straining to reach these difficult problems when the ! 
Board itself has not. seen fit, at any time, to base its exclusion 
of Konigsberg on his failure to answer. If and when a State 
makes failure to answer a question an independent ground for , 
exclusion from the Bar, then this Court, as the cases arise, 
- will-have to determine whether the exclusion is constitutionally 
permissible. We do not mean to intimate any view on that 
problem here nor do we mean to approve or disapprove 
Konigsberg's refusal to answer the particular questions 
asked him. " 
The majority opinion interprets the remanding order and 
the above-quoted portion of the opinion as a direction, or at : 
least an authorization, to return the proceeding to The State 
Bar to permit it to refuse certification solely on the ground 
that Konigsberg had refused to cooperate by refusing to 
answer questions about his political affiliations. This is not a 
correct interpretation of the remanding order. Obviously, 
what the Supreme Court meant by the quotation, supra, is 
that California has never adopted a statute or a rule making 
failure to answer, ipso facto, a ground for refusal to certify, 
and that The State Bar could not properly contend that on 
the record there involved such was a valid- ground for refusal 
to certify. Without such a statute or rule the point could not 
be urged. Certainly the Supremf' Court could not have meant 
that without a statute or rule the Board of Bar Examiners 
could create a "rule" simply by warning Konigsberg that 
the effect of refusal to answer would be to cause the board 
to refuse his certification. Such a warning, coming four years 
after Konigsberg first appeared before the committee, does 
not comply with rules of "elemental fairness" as required 
by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Rules for admission to practice law are not to be adopted 
in this cavalier fashion. The only rules passed by the Leg-
islature provide that the applicant must be of good moral 
character, and must not advocate the forceful overthrow. 
There is no rule about failing to answer. If California i8 
to adopt a new rule relating to failure to answer questioDl!, 
such rule or statute should be adopted in the manner rules 
and statutes are normally adopted. Here the so-called "rule" I 
was adopted in the middle of a proceeding as an afterthought 
simply to justify the actions of the Bar Committee in refusing 
to certify Konigsberg for admission. To sanction such a pro-
C) 
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cedure is not only unfair but., in my opinion, a denial of due 
process and equal protection. 
After the careful review of the evidence made by the United I 
States Supreme Court, and after holding that such evidence 
did not justify the refusal to certify, when the high court 
remanded the case "for further proceedings not inconsistent 
with this opinion" it meant, and must have meant, that this 
court was to grant the petition of Konigsberg, unless new facts 
relating. to character or loyalty were produced. Any other 
action was necessarily inconsistent with the opinion of the 
Supreme Court of the United States. 
Of course, had The State Bar made a showing that after 
the first hearings and while the case was on appeal it had 
discovered new evidence that Konigsberg was not of good 
moral character and not a loyal citizen, the case could have 
been remanded to The State Bar to hear and consider that 
evidence. But no such showing was made and no such evi-
dence produced. 
Thus the majority opinion, in my view, violates the remand 
order of the United States Supreme Court. 
In addition, the majority opinion also violates the law of 
the case as established by the high court. As already pointed 
out, all of the questions Konigsberg refused to 8J:!.swer were 
addressed to the inquiry as to whether he was or had been a 
member of the Communist Party. The only legitimate pur-
pose behind those questions was to ascertain whether Konigs-
berg advocated or had ever advocated the forceful overthrow 
of the government of the United States. Konigsberg answered, 
and answered frankly, every question directed to that subject. 
The State Bar produced no evidence to the contrary. In dis-
c~ing the answers given by Konigsberg, the United States 
Supreme Court (Konigsbe,.g v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, at 
p. 271) had this to say: "Konigsberg repeatedly testified under 
oath before the Committee [and he gave similar answers at 
the last hearing] that he did not believe in nor advocate the 
overthrow of any government in this country by any uncon-
stitutional means. For example, in response to one question 
as to whether he advocated overthrowing-the Government, 
he emphatically declared: 'I answer specifically I do not, I 
never did or never will.' No witness testified to the contrary. 
As a matter of fact, many of the witnesses gave testimony 
which was utterly inconsistent with the premise that he WM 
disloyal. And Konigsberg to1<1 the Committee that he was 
() 
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ready at any .lime to take au oath to uphold the Constitution 
of the United States and t.he Coustitutiou of California."1 
There is no evidence that Kouigsberg now or at allY other 
t.ime has ever advocated the forceful ovC'rthrow, or ('wr be- , 
longed to any association that he knew so advocatC'll. The 
evidence is all to the contrary. 'fhe United StatC's Sllprcme' 
Court after reviewing the evidence then before it, and llO 
other evidence has been produced on the issue, had this to say 
(K()1Iigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, at p. 273) : "We rec-
ognize the importance of leaving States free to select their own 
bars, but it is equally important that the State not exercise 
this power in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner nor iu ' 
such way as to impinge 011 the freedom of political expression 
or association. A bar composed of lawyers of good character' 
is a worthy objective but it is unnecessary to sacrifice vital 
freedoms in order to obtain that goal. It is also important 
both to society and the bar itself that lawyers be unintimidated 
-free to think, speak, and act as members of an Independent 
Bar. In this case we are compelled to conclude that there is 
no evide'Me in the record which rationally justifies a finding 
that Kcmigsberg failed to establish his good moral character 
or failed to show that he did not advocate forceful overthrow 
of the Government. [Italics added.] Without some authentic 
reliable evidence of unlawful or immoral actions reflecting 
adversely upon him, it is difficult to comprehend why the 
State Bar Committee rejected a man of Konigsberg's back-
ground and character as morally unfit to practice law. As we 
said before, the mere fact of Konigsberg's past membership 
in the Communist Party, if true, without anything more, is 
not an adequate basis for concluding that he is disloyal or a 
person of bad character. A lifetime of good citizenship is 
worth very little if it is so frail that it cannot withstand 
the suspicions which apparently were the basis for the Com-
mittee's action." 
It must be remembered that at the various hearings Konigs-
berg produced evidence of 54 persons who testified in cletail 
about almost every phase of his adult life. Not one word or 
one bit of evidence was procluced to show that Konigsberg 
had ever committed a wrongful, improper or disloyal act. 
The evidenee was all to the contrary. Applicant himself 
testified tlmt IH~ did 1I0t and neVt'I' had advocated the for('e£1I1 
'This is the oath required by California la.w-Business and Professions 
Code, lIeetion 6067, 
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overthrow. The United States Supreme Court was much 
impressed by this testimony. An examination of that court 'Ii 
opinion will demonstrate to a certainty that it held that, on 
the record before it, and the present record is stronger in 
this respect, Konigsberg had affirmatively demonstrated that 
he possessed a good moral character and was a loyal citizen. 
This is the law of this case. 
The high court stated that the issue before it was "Does 
the evidence in the record support any reasonable doubts 
about Konigsberg's good character or his loyalty to the Govern-
ments of the State and Nation T ••• 
"Konigsberg claims that he established his good moral 
character by overwhelming evidence and carried the burden 
of proving that he does not advocate overthrow of the Gov-
ernment. He contends here, as he did in the California court, 
that there is no evidence in the record which rationally sup-
ports a finding of doubt about his character or loyalty .... If 
this is true, California's refusal to admit him is a denial of 
due process and. of equal protection of the laws because both 
arbitrary and discriminatory. After examination of the 
record, we are compelled to agree with Konigsberg that the 
evidence does not rationally support the only two grounds 
upon which the Committee relied in rejecting his applica-
tion ..• " (353 U.S. at p. 262.) 
Then, after referring to the evidence produced by Konigs-
berg on the issue of his character, the court stated (353 U.S. 
at p. 265) : "Other witnesses testified to Konigsberg's belief 
in democracy and devotion to democratic ideas, his principled 
convictions, his honesty and integrity, his conscientiousness 
and competence in his work, his concern and affection for 
his wife and children and his loyalty to the country. These, 
of course, have traditionally been the kind of qualities that 
make up good moral character. The significance of the state-
ments made by these witnesses about Konigsberg is enhanced 
by the fact that they had known him as an adult while he 
was employed in responsible professional positions. Even 
more significant, not a single person has tesj;ified that Konigs-
berg's moral character was bad or questionable in any way." 
After referring to evidence of Konigsberg's background the I 
court refers to this evidence of character as "Konigsberg's 
forceful showing of good moral character" and comments on 
the fact that "there is no evidence that he has ever been con-
victed of any crime or has ever done anything base or de-
praved" the high court refers to eertain arguments of The 
o 
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State Bar and concludes "When the:;e items are analyzed, we 
helievc it cannot rationally be said that they lSupport sub-
~tantial doubts about Konigsberg's moral fitness to practiee 
law." (353 U.S. at p. 266.) This is the law of this case. 
Then, after analyzing all the evidence on this issue relied 
upon by The State Bar, the court stated: "On the record 
before us, it is our judgment that the inferences of bad moral 
character which the Committee attempted to draw from 
Konigsberg's refusal to answer questions about his political 
affiliations and opinions are unwarranted." (353 U.S. at 
p.270.) 
After discussing at length the evidence that The State Bar 
relied upon to show possible advocacy of forceful overthrow, 
the United States Supreme Court concluded with the state-
ment already quoted but which bears repetition: "In this 
c~ase we are compellrd to conclude that there is no evidence 
in the record which rationally justifies a finding that Konigs-
berg failed to establish his good moral character or failed to 
show that he did not advocate forceful overthrow of the Gov-
ernment. . .. it is difficult to comprehend why the State Bar 
Committee rejected a man of Konigsberg's background and 
character as morally unfit to practice law .... A lifetime of 
good citizenship is worth very little if it is so frail that it 
cannot withstand the suspicions which apparently were the 
basis for the Committee's action. JJ (353 U.S. at p. 273.) 
This, too, is the law of this case. 
'rhus it is the law of this case that the record before the 
Supreme Court of the United States established, as a matter 
of law, that applicant, without conflict, proved that he 
possessed a good moral character and was a loyal citizen. 
The present record is even stronger in this respect. If it be 
taken as established as a matter of law that applicant possesses 
such a character and is loyal, the two statutory requirements 
involved, of what relevancy is it that he refused to answer 
questions as to his political affiliations' The holding that mere 
refusal to answer the questions justified refusing certification, 
under the Cil·l"IlIDstances here, necessarily violates the law of 
the case as established by the high court. . 
Stated another way, if tbe record before the high court 
established these facts as a matter of law, the record now 
before this court also, necessarily, shows these facts as a matter 
of law. Therefore, it is a necessary condusion from the 
majority opinion that although Konigsberg affirmatively 
o 
sustained the burden of showing hy very substantial and uu-
contradicted evidence that he pos.'{csscs a good moral char-
acter and is a loyal citizcn, and although the recol'd will sup-
port no other conclusion, he may be denied admission solely 
because he refused to cooperate by answering questions about 
his political affiliations. Thus, although the petitioner has 
affirmatively sustained his burden of proof, and there is no 
evidence or inference from the evidence to the contrary, th~ 
majority hold that he may be denied relief solely because he 
refused to answer questions as to his political affiliations. 
For these reasons, and also for the reasons stated in the 
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Traynor, I would grant the 
petition of Konigsberg and admit him to the bar of this state. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied No-
vember 10, 1959. Gibson, C. J., deeming himself disqualified, 
did not participate therein. Draper, J., sat pro tempore- in 
place of the Chief Justice. Traynor, Acting C. J., and 
Peters, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be 
granted. 
